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The Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons 
Act of2000 (RLUIPA): A Valid Exercise of 
Congressional Power? 
Shawn Jensvold* 
[L]egislatures cannot invent too many devices for subdivid-
ing property, only taking care to let their subdivisions go 
hand in hand with the natural affections of the human mind. 1 
It was not, however, to be understood that instruction in reli-
gious opinion and duties was meant to be precluded by the 
public authorities, as indifferent to the interests of society. 
On the contrary, the relations which exist between man and 
his Maker, and the duties resulting from those relations, are 
the most interesting and important to every human being, 
and the most incumbent on his study and investigation? 
--Thomas Jefferson 
I. INTRODUCTION 
In response to the substantial increase in litigation over conflicts be-
tween land use regulations and religious assembly,3 Congress passed the 
Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 
("RLUIPA"),4 signed into law on September 22, 2000. RLUIPA is a tar-
geted bill that prohibits the government from, inter alia, substantially 
burdening religious assembly. 5 RLUIPA protects religious assembly in 
Copyright © 200 I by Shawn Jcnsvold, J.D. candidate, 2002, University of California, 
Davis School of Law. The author would like to thank Professor Alan Brownstein for his invaluable 
comments and suggestions. Thanks also to professor Debra Bassett for reviewing the citations. Of 
course, any analytical or other errors must be attributed solely to the author. 
I. Thomas Jefferson to James Madison, Oct. 28, 1785, reprinted in 8THE PAPERS OF 
THOMAS JEFFERSON682 (Julian P. Boyd ed., 1953). 
2. Thomas Jefferson, Minutes of the Board of Visitors of the University of Virginia (Oct. 7, 
1822), reprinted in 19 THE WRITINGS OF THOMAS JEFFERSON 414 (Albert Ellery Bergh ed., 1907). 
3. See, e.g., Von G. Keetch and Matthew K. Richards, The Needfi>r Legislation to Enshrine 
Free Exercise in the Land Use Context, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 725 (1999); Douglas Laycock, State 
RFRAs and Land Use Regulation, 32 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 755 (1999). Mr. Keetch is a partner at the 
law firm of Kirton & McConkie in Salt Lake City. Professor Laycock serves as the Alice McKean 
Young Regents Chair in Law at the University ofTexas at Austin. 
4. Pub. L. No. 106-274, I, 114 Stat. 803 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. 2000cc) [RLUIPA]. 
5. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a)(l ). The First Amend-
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two particular areas. First, it precludes the government from imposing 
substantial burdens upon the religious practices of individuals, assem-
blies, and institutions through land use regulations.6 In a following sec-
tion, RLUIPA protects the religious rights of prisoners.7 Regarding land 
use regulations, RLUIPA applies only to the extent that Congress has 
power to regulate under the Commerce Clause, the Spending Clause, or 
Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.8 
Under RLUIPA, if a government substantially burdens the exercise 
of religion through a land use regulation, it must demonstrate that the 
imposition of the burden serves a compelling state interest and is the 
least restrictive means for furthering that interest.9 RLUIPA also prohib-
its governments from imposing or implementing land use regulations that 
discriminate against religious assemblies, treating religious assemblies 
on "less than equal terms" than secular groups, or totally excluding reli-
gious assemblies from particular jurisdictions. 10 
This article will focus on the constitutionality of RLUIPA as it per-
tains to land use regulation. More specifically, it will examine whether 
Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment by imposing RLUIPA's land use provisions upon the States." 
Recently, the Supreme Court restricted Congress's power under Sec-
tion 5. 12 For a law to be a valid exercise of Congress's power under Sec-
tion 5: 
There must be a congruence and proportionality between the injury to 
be prevented or remedied and the means adopted to that end. Lacking 
such a connection, legislation may become substantive in operation and 
effect. 13 
ment's Free Exercise Clause protects religious assembly. The First Amendment states: "Congress 
shall make no law ... prohibiting the free exercise" of religion. U.S. CONST. amend. I. 
6. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act§ 2(a)( I). 
7. See id. § 3. 
8. See id. §§ 2(a)(2)(a)-(c). 
9. See id. § 2(a)( I). The compelling state interest and least restrictive means tests are collec-
tively known as "strict scrutiny." 
10. !d.§§ 2(b)(l)-(3). 
II. Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads: "The Congress shall have power to en-
force, by appropriate legislation, the provisions of this article." U.S. CON ST. amend. XIV, § 5. This 
paper will not address questions regarding institutionalized persons, or Congress's power to regulate 
land use regulations under the Commerce and Spending Clauses. This is a legitimate analytical exer-
cise, because RLUIPA contains a "severability" clause. See Religious Land Use and Institutionalized 
Persons Act § 5(i). Thus, if the Court strikes down one section of the act as unconstitutional, the 
other sections remain in force. 
12. See City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507, 520-21 (1997) (striking down the Religious 
Freedom and Restoration Act (RFRA) on grounds that Congress exceeded its Section 5 enforcement 
power). For further discussion of Flores and RFRA, see infra notes 37-46 and accompanying text. 
13. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520. 
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Stated another way, any legislation enacted under Congress's Section 
5 power must remedy or prevent 14 a violation of the substantive provi-
sions of Section l of the Fourteenth Amendment as the Supreme Court 
has interpreted it. 15 If the legislation does not remedy or prevent such a 
violation, then it does not enforce the Fourteenth Amendment, but rather 
attempts to alter the meaning of the constitutional provision(s) at issue. 16 
It is the responsibility of the courts, not Congress, to interpret the Consti-
tution, and nothing in Section 5 suggests otherwise. 17 
In response to the Court's "congruence and proportionality" re-
quirement, RLUIPA's legislative history is replete with examples where 
land use regulations have suppressed religious assembly. 18 Critics of 
RLUIPA, however, argue that these examples do not demonstrate a "pat-
tern of 'widespread and persisting' constitutional violations by the 
states." 19 Instead of remedying or preventing religious discrimination, 
RLUIPA, its detractors maintain, is an unconstitutional intrusion upon 
the rights of local governments to control the use of land within their re-
spective jurisdictions. 20 
Related to the issue of whether RLUIPA is remedial or preventive 
are general concerns over federalism. Because local governments retain 
almost exclusive control over land use, RLUIPA's critics argue that the 
law is inconsistent with the Constitution's general principles of federal-
ism and the specific language of the Tenth Amendment. 21 As a federal 
regulation requiring judicial review of Free Exercise challenges to land 
use regulations, RLUIPA, critics fear, will preclude the people, acting 
14. "Remedial" implies relief for existing constitutional violations, while "preventive" indi-
cates a prophylactic function. 
15. Section I states that no State shall "deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, with-
out due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the 
laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,~ I. 
16. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 520. 
17. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 178 (1803) ("So if a law be in opposition to the 
constitution; if both the law and the constitution apply to a particular case, so that the court must 
either decide that case conformably to the law, disregarding the constitution; or conformably to the 
constitution, disregarding the law; the court must determine which of these conflicting rules governs 
the case. This is of the very essence of judicial duty."). 
18. See, e.g., 146 CONG. REC. El564 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (document submitted by Rep. 
Hyde). 
19. Marci Hamilton. letter to U.S. Senate on behalf of the National League of Cities (July 24, 
2000) [hereinafter Hamilton letter] (on file with author and available at author's personal web site: 
<http://www.marcihamilton.com/rlpa/rluipaJetter.htm>) (quoting Flores, 521 U.S. at 526). Profes-
sor Hamilton is a Professor of Law at Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law and was the lead counsel 
for the City of Boerne in Flores. 
20. See, e.g., id. 
21. See, e.g., id. The Tenth Amendment reads: "The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States respectively, 
or to the people." U.S. CONST. amend. X. 
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through their local governments, from controlling land use within their 
communities. 22 
RLUIPA is a carefully crafted piece of legislation, despite the valid 
concerns over the Act's seemingly expansive control over land use regu-
lations offered by local government officials, legal scholars, and others. 
Indeed, the language of RLUIPA clearly indicates that Congress at-
tempted to address the Court's concerns in Flores concerning the scope 
of Congress's power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.23 
The factors that will determine whether RLUIP A will survive judicial re-
view and succeed in protecting religion against land use discrimination 
are the focus of this article. 
II. RLUIPA AND THE SUPREME COURT'S FREE EXERCISE CLAUSE 
JURISPRUDENCE 
A. Employment Division v. Smith24 and the Demise ofStrict Scrutiny 
Before analyzing the constitutional merits of RLUIPA, it is useful to 
briefly examine the Supreme Court's recent treatment of the Free Exer-
cise Clause. The compelling state interest test that RLUIPA requires for 
land use regulations when they substantially burden religious exercise 
has its roots in the Supreme Court's early Free Exercise Clause cases. 25 
In 1990, however, the Supreme Court, in perhaps its most unpopular 
decision of the latter half of the twentieth century, virtually abandoned 
the use of strict scrutiny in Free Exercise Clause cases. 26 Justice Scalia, 
writing for the Court in Smith, stated that the Court had "never held that 
an individual's religious beliefs excuse him from compliance with an 
otherwise valid law prohibiting conduct that the State is free to regu-
late."27 The Court cited numerous cases to support its holding that strict 
scrutiny does not apply to cases where individuals request relief from 
obedience to neutral laws of general applicability. n 
22. See. e.g., Hamilton Letter, supra note 19. 
23. See injra notes 46-48 and accompanying text. 
24. 494 U.S. 872 ( 1990). 
25. The Court first applied the compelling state interest test to the Free Exercise Clause in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963). In theory, the compelling state interest test represents the 
appropriate standard of review for free exercise claims. The Court's commitment to strict scrutiny in 
the intervening years between Sherbert and Smith, however, was checkered at best. For instance, the 
Court rarely used strict scrutiny to grant religious believers exceptions to otherwise valid laws. See 
Christopher L. Eisgruber & Lawrence G. Sager, Why the Religious Freedom Restoration Act is Un-
constitutional, 69 N.Y.U. L. REV. 437,446 (1994). 
26. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884. 
27. !d. at 878-79. 
28. !d. at 879-81. For instance, the Court noted that in Braunjetd v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599 
( 1961 ), a plurality upheld Sunday-closing laws against a claim that they burdened the religious prac-
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The Court did, however, note two categories of cases where the Free 
Exercise Clause continued to require strict scrutiny review of neutral, 
generally applicable laws.29 The first category is one that the Court 
termed "hybrid rights. "30 The second exceptional category pertains to 
laws that allow for individualized governmental assessment. 31 
The Court declared that "where the State has in place a system of in-
dividualized exemptions, it may not refuse to extend that system to cases 
of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason."32 The Court's pri-
mary example of a law requiring individualized governmental assess-
ment was the unemployment compensation program in Sherbert. 33 The 
Court explained that the "without good cause" standard employed in 
South Carolina's unemployment compensation program "created a 
mechanism for individualized exemptions."34 
B. The Religious Freedom Restoration Act: Congress's Failed Attempt to 
Restore Strict Scrutiny 
Following Smith, many commentators expressed serious concern 
over the protection of religious freedom in America. 35 The concern of le-
gal scholars soon spread to Congress, which enacted the Religious Free-
dom Restoration Act of 1993 ("RFRA").36 RFRA's existence, however, 
was short-lived. In 1997, in City of Boerne v. Flores, 37 the Court declared 
tices of those whose faiths compelled them to refrain from work on other days. See Smith, 494 U.S. 
at 880. The Court also noted United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 ( 1982), where it rejected an Amish 
employer's claim that it should be exempted from Social Security taxes because the Amish faith 
prohibited participation in government support programs. See Smith, 494 U.S. at880. 
29. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881. 
30. !d. Hybrid rights claims involve not only the Free Exercise Clause, but "other constitu-
tional protections such as freedom of speech and of the press." !d. 
31. See id. at 884. 
32. !d. (quoting Bowen v. Roy, 476 U.S. 693,708 (1976)). 
33. See id. at R84. 
34. !d. (quoting Bowen, 476 U.S. at 708). In Sherhert, South Carolina's Unemployment 
Compensation Act denied eligibility for benefits to claimants who refused to accept available work 
"without good cause." Sherhert, 374 U.S. at 400. In Smith, however. the Court held that the indi-
vidualized assessment exception did not apply to Oregon drug laws that prohibited the ingestion of 
peyote, a controlled substance. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 882, 884-85. 
35. See, e.g .. Stephen L. Carter, The Resurrection of" Religious Freedom, I 07 HARV. L. RI'V. 
118, 121-23, 135-40 ( 1'193) (defending strict scrutiny of governmental laws affecting religious con-
duct); Douglas Laycock, The Remnants of" Free Exercise, 1990 Sur. CT. REV. I, 4 (lamenting the 
Smith Court's decision to defer to all facially neutral laws burdening religion); hut see, e.g., Herbert 
W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Present, and Future, REGENT U. L. REV. 7, 29-33 (1995) 
(contending that the Smith decision actually strengthened religious freedom by instituting a bright-
line test). 
36. 42 U.S.C.A. ~ 2000bb (1994). Congress enacted RFRA primarily to reverse the effect of 
Smith and restore the compelling state interest as the standard of review in cases where "religious 
exercise is substantially burdened by the government." ld at~~ 2000bb(a)(5), (b)( I )-(2). 
37. 521 U.S. 507 ( 1997). 
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RFRA to be unconstitutional. The Court held that in enacting RFRA, 
Congress exceeded its power under Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.3x 
The Court's decision in Flores generated nearly as much scholarly 
commentary as Smith. 39 One commentator took the unique approach of 
examining what Congress could do to protect religious freedom in light 
of RFRA's demise.40 In his article, Daniel 0. Conkle41 argued that Con-
gress could draft legislation grounded on alternative sources of power 
such as the Commerce Clause and Spending Clause.42 Professor Conkle 
also suggested that Congress could ground alternative legislation on its 
enforcement power under Section 5, but such a law would have to be 
much more narrowly tailored than RFRA in order to meet Flores's "con-
gruence and proportionality" requirement.43 According to Professor 
Conkle, one method by which Congress could achieve such narrow tai-
loring would be to target specific "governmental practices that are likely 
to reflect [religious] discrimination.',44 One such governmental practice is 
land use regulation.45 
C. RLUJPA: Congress's Latest Attempt to Protect Religious Freedom 
RLUIPA's land use provisions track some of Professor Conkle's 
suggestions remarkably well.46 In section 2(a), for example, RLUIPA 
stipulates: 
(a) Substantial Burdens 
38. See id. The Court stated that Congress's powers under Section 5---the Enforcement 
Clause--were remedial and preventive, not substantive, in nature. /d. at 520. Because RFRA was 
designed solely to overturn Smith, the Court concluded, it represented a substantive, rather than re-
medial or preventive, action. See id. at 512, 532. 
39. See. e.g., MarciA. Hamilton, City of Boerne v. Flores: A LandmarkjiJr Structural Analy-
sis, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 699 ( 1998) (analyzing the constitutional principles supporting the Flo-
res decision); Douglas Laycock, Conceptual Gulf.i· in City of Boerne v. Flores, 39 WM. & MARY L. 
REV. 743 (1998) (arguing that RFRA was indistinguishable from various other statutes Congress 
passed under its Section 5 power). 
40. See Daniel 0. Conkle. Congressional Alternatives in the Wake of City of Boerne v. Flo-
res: The (Limited) Role ol Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom Ji'om State and Local ln-
.fi'ingement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633 (1998). 
4 I. Robert H. McKinney Professor of Law, Nelson Poynter Senior Scholar, and Adjunct Pro-
fessor of Religious Studies, Indiana University at Bloomington. 
42. See Daniel 0. Conkle, Congressional Alternatives in the Wake o{City of Boerne v. Flo-
res: The (Limited) Role ol Congress in Protecting Religious Freedom from State and Local In-
fringement, 20 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 633, 646 ( 1998). 
43. Flores, 521 U.S. at 520; see Conkle, supra note 42 at 647. 
44. See Conkle, supra note 42, at 650. 
45. See id. 
46. Compare Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a), with Conkle, su-
pra note 42, at 646-50. 
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(I) General rule. No government shall impose or implement a land usc 
regulation in a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the reli-
gious exercise of a person, including a religious assembly or institution, 
unless the government demonstrates that imposition of the burden on 
that person, assembly, or institution 
(a) is in the furtherance of a compelling state interest; and 
(b) is the least restrictive means of furthering that compelling govern-
mental interest 
(2)Scope olapplication. This subsection applies in any case in which--
(a) the substantial burden is imposed in a program or activity that re-
ceives Federal financial assistance, even if the burden results from a 
rule of general applicability; 
(b) the substantial burden affects, or removal of that substantial burden 
would affect, commerce with foreign nations, among the several states, 
or with Indian tribes, even if the burden results from a rule of general 
applicability; or 
(c) the substantial burden is imposed in the implementation of a land 
use regulation or system of land use regulations, under which a gov-
ernment makes, or has in place formal or informal procedures or prac-
tices that permit the government to make, individualized assessments of 
the proposed uses for the property involved. 
7 
Section 2(a)( I) of RLUIPA is similar to RFRA in that it attempts to 
reinstate strict scrutiny as the standard of review for cases involving gov-
ernmental imposition of substantial burdens upon religious expression. In 
section 2(a)(2), however, RLUIPA diverges significantly from RFRA. 
In sections 2(a)(2)(a)-(b), Congress grounded RLUIPA on its regula-
tory powers under the Spending and Commerce Clauses, respectively.47 
Important to the present analysis, however, is section 2(a)(2)(c), which is 
grounded on Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.4x A premise un-
derlying this section of RLUIPA is that many land use regulations, as 
applied by local officials, fall within the "individualized assessments" 
category of cases identified in Smith. If this premise is correct, then sec-
tion 2(a)(2)(c) is likely constitutional.49 This section of RLUIPA would 
47. Sec Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act§§ 2(a)(2)(a)-(b); see also U.S. 
CONST. art. I,§ 8. 
48. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a)(2)(c) does not specifically 
mention Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment, but because it is not grounded upon any of Con-
gress's powers enumerated in Article l, Section 5 is the only available source through which Con-
gress may enact such a provision. 
49. Even assuming the constitutionality of§ 2(a)(2)(c), Congress still may have exceeded its 
power under the Enforcement Clause in§ 2(b). See infra notes 174-184 and accompanying text. 
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be a valid exercise of Congress's Enforcement Clause power because it 
merely clarifies the Court's own holding that laws which provide gov-
ernmental officials with the power to make individualized assessments 
are not generally applicable, and therefore, require strict scrutiny re-
view.50 
Ill. RLUIPA, LAND USE REGULATIONS, AND SMITH'S INDIVIDUALIZED 
ASSESSMENTS EXCEPTION 
This section will analyze the validity of the assumption underlying 
section 2(a)(2)(c) ofRLUIPA-that most land use regulations, as applied 
in free exercise cases, fall within Smith's individualized assessments ex-
ception. First, it will examine American land use regulations and the 
level of discretionary decision-making power they provide government 
officials. Second, it will review the application of the Smith exception in 
existing case law, including its level of compatibility with land use regu-
lations. 
A. American Land Use Regulations and the Level of Individualized 
Discretion They Provide Government Officials 
Of the various types of land use regulations, zoning laws are the tar-
get of the vast majority of free exercise challenges. Consequently, this 
analysis will focus on the level of discretionary decision-making that 
zoning laws in America generally provide to local governing bodies.51 
In 1916, New York City passed the first zoning ordinance in the 
United States.52 Ten years after the passage of the first zoning ordinance, 
the Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such regulations.53 
Around the same time, the Commerce Department drafted the Standard 
State Zoning Enabling Act (Standard Act). The Commerce Department 
designed the Standard Act as a zoning legislative model, through which 
state could, among other things, "lessen congestion in the 
streets; ... secure safety from fire, panic, and other dangers; ... promote 
50. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85; cf Flores, 521 U.S. at 536 ("When the political branches 
of the Government act against the background of a judicial interpretation of the Constitution already 
issued. it must be understood that in later cases and controversies the Court will treat its precedents 
with the respect due them under settled principles, including stare decisis, and contrary expectations 
must be disappointed."). Section 2(a)(2)(c), unlike RFRA, would not negate the basic holding of 
Smith, and therefore would not undercut stare decisis. 
51. Landmark preservation laws also frequently appear in free exercise claims. Landmark 
preservation laws, however, operate in similar fashions to zoning ordinances. See infra notes 127-
135, 166-170 and accompanying text. 
52. See l ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONINC> § 1.02, at 6 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th 
ed. 1996) [hereinafter l ANDERSON'S]. 
53. See Vill. of Euclid v. Amber Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 3XX ( 1926 ). 
1] RLUIPA AND CONGRESSIONAL POWER 9 
health and the general welfare; ... [and] avoid undue concentration of the 
population."54 Eventually, all states passed zoning enabling legislation, 
most of which reflect the intentions of the Standard Act. 55 
The Standard Act granted power to state legislatures to pass and 
amend zoning enabling legislation.56 Municipalities, however, held the 
responsibilities of dividing their respective lands into districts of varying 
types to best carry out the purposes of the Standard Act. 57 The Standard 
Act authorized municipalities to create "boards of adjustment," which 
could "make special exceptions to the terms of the ordinance in harmony 
with its general purpose and intent."58 The primary device the Standard 
Act provided to boards of adjustment for making exceptions to the terms 
of zoning ordinances was the hardship variance. 59 
Zoning boards of adjustment are independent administrative bodies 
that act in a quasi-judicial capacity to grant variances and other excep-
tions to zoning ordinances.60 "A variance is an authorization for the con-
struction or maintenance of a building or structure, or for the establish-
ment or maintenance of a use of land, which is prohibited by a zoning 
ordinance."61 Adjustment boards grant variances primarily to parties who 
demonstrate that a literal application of a zoning ordinance will cause 
them "practical difficulties or unnecessary hardship."62 
As municipalities throughout the nation were implementing zoning 
ordinances, some state courts described standards such as "practical dif-
ficulties" and "undue hardship" as vague and indefinite, which provided 
adjustment boards with nearly unlimited discretion. 63 GraduaJJy, how-
ever, most state courts accepted these terms, even though many of them 
disagreed as to the level of discretion the terms gave adjustment boards.64 
State courts have differed considerably in their interpretations of the 
54 Standard State Zoning Enabling Act§ 3 (1926), reprinted in 5 ANDERSON'S 
AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING§ 32.01 at 4 (Alan C. Weinstein ed., 4th ed., 1997) 
[hereinafter Standard Act]. 
55. See I ANDERSON'S S 2.2 I, supra note 52, at 67. 
56. See Standard Act § 2. 
57. See id. 
58. !d. at 6-8. 
59. See DANIEL R. MAN DELKER, LAND USE LAW S 4.15, at I 08 (4th ed. 1997). 
60. See Rogoff v. Tufariello, 255 A.2d 781, 784 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1969). 
61. 3 ANDERSON'S AMERICAN LAW OF ZONING § 20.02, at 410 (Kenneth H. Young ed., 4th 
ed. 1996) [hereinafter 3 ANDERSON'S]. 
62. !d. at 412. 
63. See, e.g., Speroni v. Board of Appeals, 15 N.E.2d 302, 303 (Ill. 1938). 
64. See 3 ANDERSON's § 20.08, supra note 60, at 435 (noting that some state courts consid-
ered the meaning of such terms to be commonly understood and thus providing adjustment boards 
with reasonable discretion, while others simply accepted that the terms provided boards with broad 
general powers, because such discretion was necessary to maintain validity of zoning ordinances). 
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meaning of terms such as "unnecessary hardship" and "practical difficul-
ties." 
Universally, American courts have concluded that a financial hard-
ship alone is not sufficient to demonstrate an unnecessary (or undue) 
hardship.1'5 Beyond that, however, there is considerable disagreement 
among the various states. For instance, the New Hampshire Supreme 
Court held that a financial hardship becomes an unnecessary hardship re-
quiring the granting of a variance when conditions unique to the particu-
lar property become unduly oppressive.66 In contrast, a Pennsylvania 
court ruled that "unnecessary hardship is a condition which renders a 
property almost valueless without the grant of a variance."67 
Although the majority of states follow the New Hampshire example 
of defining "unnecessary hardship" broadly, many others have restricted 
the definition of the term in a manner similar to the Pennsylvania court. 6x 
Even under the more restrictive definition, though, the authority that zon-
ing adjustment boards possess to grant variances is administrative and 
quasi-judicial in nature. 69 Inherent in such authority is the ability to exer-
cise considerable discretion. 
Besides variances, the other major category of exceptions to zoning 
ordinances is the special permit. 70 There are two major differences be-
tween variances and special permits. First, variances allow for uses of 
land or construction of structures that are prohibited by the particular 
zoning ordinance.71 In contrast, special permits are granted to uses or 
structures that are permitted by the zoning ordinance, but require prior 
approval. 72 The second difference is that variances run with the land, 
while special permits die with the owner. 73 
As with variances, the power of adjustment boards to grant special 
permits is also a quasi-judicial, rather than a legislative function. 74 In-
deed, because of the different standards governing the exceptions, the 
degree of discretionary decision-making power boards of adjustment 
employ in granting special permits is arguably greater than with vari-
65. See id ~ 20.16, al 454. 
66. S('(' Carter v. City of Nashua, 30R A.2d 847, 855 (N.H. 1973). 
o7. Schaefer v. Zoning Bd. of Adjustment, 435 A.2d 289, 292 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 1981 ). 
68. See 3 i\NDI·RSON'S 9 20.16, supra note oO, at 460. 
69. See id~ 20.04, at 419. The power to grant variances in cases of"practical difficulties" is 
identical lo those involving "unnecessary hardship." Only about half of !he state enabling statutes 
authorize variances to relieve "practical difficulties." Sec id ~ 20.1 0, at 440. 
70. Sci' id 9 20.03, at 414. 
71. Sccidat415. 
72. S!-'c id 
73. Sec id 
74. 5ice 3 ANDERSON'S ~ 21.17, at 769. 
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ances. The standards governing the issuance of special permits are both 
broader and more numerous than those associated with variances. 75 For 
example, the New York Court of Appeals approved a zoning ordinance 
that delegated to the Board of Adjustment the power to grant or deny a 
special permit based on the proposed use's effect upon "the public 
health, safety and general welfare."76 
The Maryland Court of Appeals also approved an ordinance with 
similarly vague language.77 The court upheld a zoning board's denial of a 
discount department store's petition for a special exemption to operate a 
gasoline station. The board concluded that the department store failed to 
meet the zoning ordinance's requirement that the applicant demonstrate 
the existence of a "need' for the proposed gasoline station among the 
population in the "general neighborhood."78 The Court of Appeals held 
that the words "need" and "general neighborhood" were not so indeter-
minate as to allow the zoning board to engage in "arbitrary or unreason-
able exercise[ s] of power."79 
There are numerous other similar standards governing the issuance 
of special permits, but the previous examples illustrate sufficiently the 
level of discretion zoning ordinances provide adjustment boards and 
other governing bodies. Although state courts have struck down ordi-
nances that provide zoning boards with "unlimited discretion to condi-
tion the issuance of ... pennit[ s] on the basis of such norms or standards 
as [they] may from time to time arbitrarily determine," the level of dis-
cretionary decision-making most ordinances provide adjustment boards 
is substantial. 80 
One final type of zoning exemption is the conditional use. Condi-
tional uses are similar to special uses in that they are permitted within the 
zone but typically require prior approval. 81 Conditional uses differ from 
special uses, however, because legislative bodies, rather than boards of 
adjustment, typically possess the authority to grant conditional use per-
mits.82 For example, the typical application for a conditional use permit 
will be sent to the city council for approval instead of a zoning board. 
Moreover, conditional use permits, like variances, run with the land.83 
75. See id. § 21.09, at 713-14. 
76. Aloe v. Dassler, I 05 N.E.2d I 04 (N.Y. 1952). 
77. See Lucky Stores, Inc. v. Bd. of Appeals, 312 A.2d 758, 767 (Md. 1973). 
7K !d. 
79. /d.(quoting Heath v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 49 A.2d 299, 803 (Md. 1946). 
80. Warwick v. Del Bonis Sand & Gravel Co., 209 A.2d 227,232 (R.I. 1965). 
81 See 3 ANDERSON'S ~ 20.05, supra note 60, at 421. 
82. See id. 
83. See, County of Imperial v. McDougal, 564 P.2d 14, 17 (Cal. 1977). 
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Despite these differences, the level of discretion provided to munici-
palities in granting conditional use permits is remarkably similar to that 
given to adjustment boards for granting special use permits.x4 The reason 
for this is that the standards governing special uses are typically the same 
as those for conditional uses. For instance, parties applying for both con-
ditional and special use permits are usually required to demonstrate that 
their proposed uses are not "detrimental to public health, safety, or gen-
eral welfare. ,xs Variance standards such as unnecessary hardship and 
practical difficulties do not usually apply to conditional uses.x6 
As the previous analysis has shown, zoning ordinances allow boards 
of adjustment and municipalities to make individualized assessments 
when evaluating petitions for variances, special uses, and conditional 
uses. The critical issue concerning the validity of Section 2(a)(2)(c) of 
RLUIPA, however, is whether the level of discretionary decision-making 
provided to governmental officials in zoning ordinances is compatible 
with the individualized assessment exception defined by the Supreme 
Court in Smith.x7 An appropriate point of comparison, then, is the level of 
governmental discretion inherent in unemployment compensations laws 
such as the one in Sherbert_xx 
In Smith, the Court held that the South Carolina unemployment com-
pensation program at issue in Sherbert "created a mechanism for indi-
vidualized exemptions" through its "without good cause" standard. x9 The 
Court noted that "a distinctive feature of unemployment compensation 
programs is that their eligibility criteria invite consideration of the par-
ticular circumstances behind an applicant's unemployment."90 A compa-
rable situation exists with zoning ordinances. 
In evaluating variance requests, for example, zoning boards neces-
sarily examine the "particular circumstances" of the applicant's proposed 
use. The previously cited New Hampshire Supreme Court case of Carter 
v. City of Nashua91 provides an excellent illustration. In Carter, the court 
upheld a zoning board's granting of a variance permitting the operation 
of a dog racing track on the New Hampshire portion of a particular tract 
of land that was situated partially in Massachusetts. 92 
84. See 3 i\NDFRSON'S g 20.05, supra note 60, at 421. 
85. Warren v. Collier Township Bd. ofComm'rs, 437 A.2d 86, XX (Pa. Commw. Ct. 198 I). 
86. But see 3 ANDERSO"'s (j 20.05, supra note 60, at 42] (noting that "unnecessary hard-
ship" and "practical difficulties" are used as standards for granting conditional usc variances). 
87. S('e Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. 
ll8. See Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 400-01. 
89. Smith, 494 U.S. at X84. 
90. ld (citing Bowen, 476 U.S. at 70X). 
91. 30XA.2d847(N.fL 1973). 
92. See id at 856. 
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In its opinion, the New Hampshire Supreme Court summarized the 
trial court's evaluation of the rationale behind the zoning board's deci-
sion to grant the variance.93 First, the trial court determined that the dog 
racing track would benefit the business, commercial, and light industrial 
areas located within several miles of the tract at issue. 94 Furthermore, the 
trial court noted that all of the surrounding property owners had con-
sented to the variance, that there were few residential neighborhoods 
near the tract, and that residents approved a referendum on whether a dog 
track should be located within the city.95 
Based on Carter, it appears clear that to determine the existence of 
an "unnecessary hardship," zoning boards must consider the "particular 
circumstances" of the applicant's proposed land use. 96 Therefore, at least 
in relation to variances, zoning ordinances create "a mechanism for indi-
vidualized exemptions."97 
Because the standards governing special use and conditional use 
permits are even more indefinite than those associated with variances, 
the same conclusion applies. For instance, it is difficult to imagine how a 
board of adjustment could determine whether a proposed use promotes 
"the public health, safety and general welfare" without examining the 
specific circumstances of the landowner's claim. 98 
In summary, the application of zoning ordinances, through the issu-
ance of variances, special use permits, and conditional use permits, fall 
within the Smith court's individualized assessment exception.99 Conse-
quently under Smith, strict scrutiny is the appropriate standard of review 
for the majority of claims involving Free Exercise Clause challenges of 
zoning ordinances or decisions by zoning boards. 100 
A smaller percentage of zoning laws, however, provide minimal or 
no discretion to local governmental officials. Some of these ordinances 
even contain provisions for variances or special use permits. 101 Other 
zoning ordinances apply only to particular tracts of land and allow only a 
limited number of uses with no exceptions. These laws provide minimal 
93. See id at R55. 
94. See id. 
95. See id. The trial court examined these various factors as part of its analysis on whether 
overturning the variance would constitute an "unnecessary hardship" on the owner. 
96. Smith, 494 U.S. at 8S4. 
97. !d. (quoting Bowen 476 U.S. at 70S). 
98. Aloe v. Dassler, 105 N.E.2d 104, 104 (N.Y 1952). 
99. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 884-85. 
I 00. See id at 883. 
I 0 I. For example, some zoning ordinances allow for variances or special use permits, but limit 
such exceptions to specific uses. The level of discretion provided to government officials is much 
less than those that allow exceptions for "unnecessary hardships" or those that promote "public 
health, safety. safety and general welfare." 
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or no discretion to local government officials. Under the Smith standard, 
therefore, such laws would likely be considered generally applicable and 
strict scrutiny would not apply. 
In the free exercise context, Cornerstone Bible Church v. City of 
Hastings 102 presents an example of a zoning ordinance that provides little 
discretion to government officials. Cornerstone concerned a church's 
challenge of a Hastings, Minnesota zoning ordinance that allowed only 
"commercial establishments, public and semi-public buildings, private 
clubs, second-floor apartments, parking lots," and other accessory uses 
within its central business district. 103 The ordinance also listed other par-
ticular uses that could be allowed upon the grant of a special use permit. 
Such uses included gas stations, creameries, and hotels, but not 
churches. 104 
The Hastings ordinance, by granting special use permits only for 
specified uses, provided significantly less discretion to government offi-
cials than most zoning laws. As noted earlier, most zoning ordinances 
that allow boards of adjustment to grant special use permits, do so ac-
cording to broad standards such as promoting public health and safety. 
The Hastings ordinance, however, did not establish indeterminate stan-
dards as the means by which special use permits were awarded. There-
fore under Smith, strict scrutiny would likely not apply. 105 
B. Smith's Individualized Assessments Exception and its Current Use in 
Free Exercise Clause Case Law 
Despite the existence of some zoning laws that provide little discre-
tion to government officials, the majority of land use regulations provide 
government with significant discretionary decision-making power. Con-
sequently, most zoning laws likely fall within Smith's individualized as-
sessments exception. Considering that Smith was decided over ten years 
ago, there is very little case law analyzing the Smith exception. Cases 
that have interpreted the Smith exception, however, reflect favorably on 
its incorporation into the Court's Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence. 
102. 948 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1991 ). 
103. !d at 4A6. 
104. It can be reasonably argued that the Hastings ordinance discriminates against religious 
institutions by allowing semi-public buildings and second-floor apartments but not churches and 
other worship centers. Worship centers. however, may be more inconsistent with the general plan for 
a commercial district than other non-business uses. For example. when "residential or inconsistent 
commercial uses intrude [into an area comprised of primarily retail establishments] they create hlank 
spaces or even hazards to pedestrian traffic." 2 ANDERSON's AMERICAN LAW m ZoNJN(; ~ 9.42, at 
249 (Kenneth H. Young cd., 4th ed. 1996). 
105. See Cornerstone, 948 F.2d at 472. The Eighth Circuit cited Smith in denying the church's 
free exercise claim. The cmui held that the Hastings ordinance was a neutral law that applied to all 
land uses and therefore did not discriminate against religious conduct. See id 
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First, the only Supreme Court case discussing the individualized as-
sessments exception is Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of 
Hialeah. 106 In Lukumi, the Court struck down several city ordinances 
prohibiting the ritual slaughter of animals as violating the Free Exercise 
Clause. 107 In particular, the Court struck down an ordinance that provided 
for the punishment of "[ w ]hoever ... unnecessarily ... kills any ani-
mal."108 The Court found that the ordinance violated the Free Exercise 
Clause because it specifically targeted appellant's religious practice of 
animal sacrifice. 109 
The Court held that the ordinance was not a neutral, generally appli-
cable law, because while it prohibited killing animals for religious rea-
sons, it allowed other methods of killing animals such as hunting and 
euthanasia. 110 The Court further noted that the ordinance's "necessity" 
requirement necessitated an evaluation of the particular justification for 
killing animals. 111 This, the Court concluded, represented "a system of 
'individualized governmental assessment of the reasons for the relevant 
conduct. '"112 
The Third Circuit Court of Appeals also decided a case based in part 
on its interpretation of the Smith exception. 113 In Fraternal Order of Po-
lice v. City of Newark, the Third Circuit struck down a Newark Police 
Department ordinance that prohibited the wearing of beards. 114 Several 
Sunni Muslim officers challenged the policy on free exercise grounds af-
ter being disciplined for violating the policy. 115 According to the court, it 
is a "major sin" under the Sunni Muslim faith for any male who can 
grow a beard to refuse to wear one. 116 
The Third Circuit, in striking down the no-beard policy, held that the 
police department created not merely a mechanism for individualized ex-
emptions, but "a categorical exemption for individuals with a secular ob-
jection but not for individuals with a religious objection."117 The depart-
ment exempted other officers for medical reasons, while refusing to 
/06. 508 U.S. 520 (1993). 
I 07. See id at 54 7. 
I 08. !d. at 537. 
109. See id 
110 See id 
Ill. See id. 
112. 508 U.S. at 537 (quoting Smith, 494 U.S. at 884). 
113. See Fraternal Order of Police Newark v. City of Newark, 170 F.3d 359, 364-66 (3d Cir. 
1999). 
114. Seeid.at367. 
115. See hi. at 361. 
I 16. !d. at 360. 
117. !d at 365. 
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exempt the Sunni Muslim officers. 118 Thus, not only did the policy fall 
within the Smith individualized assessments exception, but it was also 
evidence of discriminatory intent. 119 
A Nebraska District Court also offered an interpretation of the Smith 
exception. 120 In Rader v. Johnston, the district court held unconstitutional 
a state university requirement that all incoming freshmen live on-
campus.121 The plaintiff, a devout Christian and incoming freshman to 
the University of Nebraska-Kearney (UNK), applied for an exemption 
from the school's on-campus housing policy so he could live in the 
Christian Student Fellowship (CSF) house, located off-campus. 122 UNK 
administrators declined plaintiffs request. 123 
The district court found the UNK on-campus housing policy to fall 
within the Smith exception because administrators had previously 
granted exemptions in a variety of different situations: to a student living 
outside of Kearny who wished to drive his pregnant sister to work; to a 
student who was depressed and experiencing headaches; to a student 
with learning disabilities; and to a student who was mourning the death 
of a parent. 124 Consequently, the district court held that the policy was 
not one of general applicability and applied the compelling state interest 
test. 125 The district court awarded plaintiff's request for injunctive re-
lief. 126 
Although the three previously cited cases demonstrate the viability of 
the Smith exception in striking down government regulations on Free 
Exercise grounds, they do not reveal precisely how the exception applies 
to land use regulations. To date, there are no federal land use cases ap-
plying the Smith exception. The Washington State Supreme Court, how-
ever, has applied the exception to the City of Seattle's application of its 
landmark preservation ordinance to a church. 
In First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 127 First Covenant Church 
objected to the City's designation of its worship facility as a landmark 
under the City's Landmark Preservation Ordinance. Seattle adopted this 
ordinance "to: 'designate, preserve, [and] protect, ... improvements and 
objects which reflect significant elements of the City's cultural, aesthetic, 
118. See id. 
119. See 170 F.3d at 365. 
120. See Raderv. Johnston. 924 F. Supp. 1540, 1551-53 (D. Ncb. 1996). 
121. Seeid.atl558. 
122. See id at 1544. 
123. See id. at 1548. 
124. Seeid.at1547. 
125. See id at 1553. 
126. See id. at 1558. 
127. 840 P.2d 174 (Wash. 1992). 
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social, economic, political, architectural, engineering, historic, or other 
heritage ... "' l2X 
After designating the church as a landmark under the general ordi-
nance, the City adopted a second ordinance specific to First Covenant. 129 
This ordinance required the church to obtain a certificate of approval 
prior to making particular alterations to the church's exterior. 130 
The City, however, in the second ordinance, declared that nothing 
prevented First Covenant from altering the church's exterior "when such 
alterations are necessitated by changes in liturgy." 131 After an extensive 
procedural history, the Washington State Supreme Court held that Seat-
tle's ordinance designating First Covenant's church a landmark violated 
the Free Exercise Clause. 132 
The court gave two reasons why the landmark ordinance was not 
generally applicable and therefore outside of the Smith ruling. First, the 
court held that because the ordinance referred to "liturgy," it specifically 
targeted religion. 133 Secondly, the court stated that the ordinance did not 
fall within the Smith ruling, because it "invite[ d] individualized assess-
ments of the subject property ... and contain[ ed] mechanisms for indi-
vidualized exceptions." 134 The court did not elaborate on this conclusion, 
but the language of the designation ordinance strongly suggests that the 
Landmarks Prevention Board had significant discretionary decision-
making authority. 135 
First Covenant demonstrates that land use regulations can fall within 
the Smith exception. Further, most zoning laws in the United States con-
fer substantial discretionary decision-making power upon their governing 
boards. It is reasonable, therefore, to conclude that a significant portion 
of free exercise claims brought under RLUIPA section 2(a)(2)(c) will fall 
128. !d. at 177 (quoting Seattle Municipal Code 25.12.020(B) (1977)). 
129. See id. at 178. 
130. See id. 
131. !d. 
132. See id. at 17S, 193. The Washington State Supreme Court first held that the designation 
ordinance violated the Free Exercise Clause under the Sherbert compelling state interest test. See id. 
at 178; First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 787 P.2d 1352, 1355-56 (Wash. 1990), vacated by 
499 U.S. 90 I, ( 1991 ). The United States Supreme Court, however, granted Seattle's petition forcer-
tiorari and vacated and remanded the case for further consideration under Smith. Sec First Covenant, 
840 P.2d at 178; City of Seattle v. First Covenant Church, 499 U.S. 90 I ( 1991 ). 
133. See First Covenant, 840 P.2d at 181. 
134. ld 
135. The ordinance provided: "When alterations necessitated by changes in liturgy are pro-
posed, the owner shall advise the Landmarks Preservation Board in writing of the nature of the pro-
posed alterations and the Board shall issue a Certificate of Approval. Prior to the issuance of any 
Certificate, however, the Board and owner shall jointly explore such possible alternative design solu-
tions as may be appropriale or necessary to preserve the destgnatedfeature.\· of"the landmark." !d. at 
178 (emphasis added). 
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within Smith's individualized assessments exception and require strict 
scrutiny review. 
Congress, therefore, at least with section 2(a)(2)(c), does not appear 
to have exceeded its enforcement power under Section 5 of the Four-
teenth Amendment. By merely requiring strict scrutiny review for claims 
involving land use regulations that provide government officials the au-
thority to make individualized assessments, RLUIPA does not intrude 
upon the Supreme Court's power to interpret the Free Exercise Clause. 
Unlike RFRA, which essentially attempted to reverse Smith, RLUIPA 
works within the Court's opinion. 
IV. POTENTIAL DIFFICULTIES WITH RLUIPA UNDER THE SUPREME 
COURT'S ENFORCEMENT CLAUSE ANALYSIS 
A. In the Context of Land Use Regulations, the Constitutional 
Definitions of Substantial Burden and Religious Exercise Are Unclear 
Although most zoning laws appear to fall within Smith's individual-
ized assessments exception, RLUIPA raises additional constitutional 
questions. RLUIPA requires courts to apply strict scrutiny review in 
cases where governments impose or implement "land use regulation[ s] in 
a manner that imposes a substantial burden on the religious exercise" of 
a person, assembly, or institution. 136 The problem with this language is 
that in land use contexts, the definitions of "substantial burden" and "re-
ligious exercise" are not entirely clear. 
Because these terms are not well-defined in the Supreme Court's 
Free Exercise Clause jurisprudence, RLUIPA may face significant con-
stitutional challenges. First, it may be that while land use regulations of-
ten create conflicts with religious exercise, they rarely place "substantial" 
burdens upon religious institutions. Another possibility is that in many 
cases, the claims brought by religious plaintiffs do not involve religious 
exercise, as defined by the Court. 
If, therefore, only a small percentage of religious land use cases in-
volve substantial burdens of religious exercise, then courts will likely not 
view RLUIPA as remedial or preventive. Instead, courts will be inclined 
to strike RLUIPA down as a substantive change in Free Exercise law. 
Determining the degree to which government burdens religious exer-
cise is a well-established step in the Supreme Court's Free Exercise 
Clause jurisprudence. 137 The Court, however, has not specified what con-
136. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(a)( I) (emphasis added). 
137. See, e.g., Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 ( 1972) ("A regulation neutral on its face 
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stitutcs a substantial, or undue, burden upon free exercise in a land usc 
context. Courts evaluating RLUIPA, therefore, will likely look to lower 
federal court decisions for guidance on what constitutes a substantial 
burden. 
One circuit court decision that sheds some light on this issue is 
Lakewood, Ohio Congregation of" Jehovah's Witnesses, Inc. v. City of 
Lakewood. 13x In Lakewood, the Congregation owned its existing worship 
facility, located in one of the City's commercial districts, but wanted to 
relocate to a larger facility in a residential district. 139 The City, however, 
refused to grant the Congregation a special use permit to construct a 
church building on the property it had pun.:hased. 140 The Sixth Circuit 
held that the City's action made the Congregation's religious exercise 
more expensive but was not an unconstitutional burden. 141 
Another relevant circuit court decision is Rector, Wardens, and 
Members of" Vestry of" St. Bartholomew's Church v. City of New York. 142 
In St. Bartholomew's, the Second Circuit ruled that New York City offi-
cials did not violate the First Amendment in refusing to allow a church to 
replace a building it owned with an office tower. 143 The Second Circuit 
held that the City's designation of the church's Community House build-
ing as a landmark did not substantially burden the church's free exercise 
rights. 144 
In addition to "substantial burden," both Lakewood and St. Bar-
tholomew's address the issue of what constitutes a "religious exercise" in 
a land use context. In Lakewood, the Sixth Circuit held that "building and 
owning a church is a desirable accessory of worship, not a fundamental 
tenet of the Congregation's religious beliefs." 145 The court's language 
may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional requirement for government neutrality 
if it unduly burdens the free exercise of religion."). 
13X. 699 F.2d 303 (hlh Cir. 19X3). 
139. See id at 304. 
140. See id at 305. 
141. See id at 30X-09. The court noted specifically that although the Congregation could con-
struct a church in only ten percent of the City (the non-residential areas), it was free to purchase any 
existing church in the remaining ninety 1Jercent. The court also stated that the zoning ordinance did 
not prohibit the Congregation from worshiping in any part of the city. 
142. 914 F.2d 34X (2d Cir. 1990). 
143. Sec id at 355-56. 
144. See id ("Incidental effects of government programs, which make it more difficult to 
practice certain religions but which have no tendency to coerce individuals into acting contrary to 
their religious beliefs, l do not] requin; government to bring forward a compelling justification for its 
otherwise lawful actions."). The landmarks law at issue prevented any alteration or demolition of 
stmctures designated as landmarks without approval of the Landmarks Commission. The City desig-
nated St. Bartholomew's Church and Community House as having special character and aesthetic 
value to the heritage and culture of New York City. See id at 351. 
145. Lakewood, 699 F.2d at 307. 
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implies that as long as a religious group has some location in which to 
gather and worship, then the government's prevention of the construction 
of a worship facility will not invoke the First Amendment. 146 This asser-
tion, however, is widely disputed. 147 
St. Bartholomew's provides another perspective on the limits of "re-
ligious exercise" in a land use context. The Second Circuit understood 
"Supreme Court decisions to indicate that neutral regulations that dimin-
ish the income of a religious organization do not implicate the free exer-
cise clause." 148 It is uncertain, however, how this principle applies be-
yond the facts of the case. 
In St. Bartholomew's, the Second Circuit held that the church failed 
to prove its claim that converting the Community House into an office 
tower was necessary for it to continue its existing religious activities. 149 
But what if, instead of an office tower, the Church had planned to con-
vert the Community House into a parochial school? 15° Further, assume 
that the church had proven that without the increased revenue generated 
by the school, it would not have been able to make the necessary repairs 
to the church building. Under these circumstances, the Church's "reli-
gious exercise" is much more apparent. Applying the Second Circuit's 
rationale, however, it is unclear whether such facts would render a dif-
ferent result. 
The rulings in Lakewood and St. Bartholomew's are indicative of cir-
cuit court decisions involving religious land use issues. In virtually every 
case, 151 circuit courts have ruled against the religious plaintiffs, finding 
the burdens on free exercise to be insubstantial. 152 
146. See id. ("The zoning ordinance does not prevent the Congregation from practicing its 
faith through worship whether the worship be in homes, schools, other churches, or meeting halls 
throughout the city."). The court, moreover, drew a line between the construction of a worship facil-
ity and the religious exercise in cases such as Yoder and Sherhert. The court concluded that the latter 
involved religious practices deserving of First Amendment protection. while the former did not. See 
id. at 306-07. 
147. See Keetch and Richards, supra note 3, at 726 ("The right to erect buildings where com-
munities of faith may gather or to make use of existing buildings to fulfill a religiously mandated 
mode of worship is ... a fundamental and indispensable aspect of the right to worship."); Laycock. 
supra note 3, at 756 ("But the recognition of some limits docs not change the essential point: assem-
bly for worship and other religious activities, and the creation of spaces in which such assemblies 
may occur, is at the very core of religious liberty."); cf Scott David Godshall. Note, Land Us<' Regu-
lation and the Free Exercise Clause, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1562, 1574 (1984) (arguing that cases such 
as Lakewood, where courts consider "the centrality of the practice to the religious group as a thresh-
old matter," lead to "unnecessarily restrictive results"). 
148. St. Bartholomew's, 914 F.2d at 355 (citing Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Bd. of Equali-
zation, 493 U.S. 378 ( 1990); Hernandez v. Comm'r, 490 U.S. 680 ( 1989)). 
149. See id. at 355-56. 
150. Assume, arguendo, that converting the Community House into a school would require 
structural changes that would invoke the landmarks law. 
151. See, e.g, Christian Gospel Church, Inc. v. San Francisco. 896 F.2d 1221 (9th Cir. 1'190) 
(upholding City/County denial of conditional use permit to operate church in residential district); 
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Circuit court decisions, however, do not reflect the vast majority of 
conflicts between religious exercise and land use regulations. First, only 
a small percentage of religious land usc cases are litigated in federal 
court. 153 Second, the percentage of circuit court cases decided in favor of 
the religious claimants is significantly less than for other cases. 154 
Cases such as Lakewood and St. Bartholomew's are important in de-
lineating the limits of what may constitute a substantial burden on free 
exercise. Because circuit court decisions do not represent the majority of 
religious land usc cases, however, courts should not over-emphasize 
them in evaluating RLUIPA. State and federal district courts, as well as 
commentators, offer alternative approaches to defining "substantial bur-
den" and "religious exercise" in religious land usc cases. 
One common scenario that raises questions of both substantial bur-
den and free exercise arises when religious institutions run homeless 
shelters. In Stuart Circle Parish v. Board of" Zoning Appeals, 155 for in-
stance, a federal district court held that it was central to the Parish's 
''faith to invite the homeless into the church to establish a climate of 
worship." 151' Further, the court declared that the city's zoning ordinance 
substantially burdened the Parish's religious exercise. 157 
Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, 859 F.2d 820 (I Oth Cir. 1988) (upholding County's 
denial of special usc permit to construct multi-purpose worship facility in agricultural district); 
Grosz v. City of Miami Reach, 721 F.2d 729 (II th Cir. 1983) (upholding city's prohibition of Jewish 
couple trom conducting worship services at their home, in violation of zoning ordinance). 
152. But see Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302 (5th Cir. 1988) 
(finding City's denial of special usc permit "more than [an] incidental" burden on the Islamic Cen-
ter's right to religious assembly, because it left "no practical alternatives for establishing a mosque in 
the city limits"); Viii. of Univ. Heights v. Cleveland Jewish Orphan's Home, 20 F.2d 743 (6th Cir. 
1927) (reversing Villiagc's denial of special usc permit for the construction of orphanage). Islamic 
Cent a is also a good example of a pre-Smith case to which the individualized assessments exception 
would have applied. Starkville's zoning ordinance prohibited the use of buildings as worship centers 
in the area surrounding the Mississippi State University campus without a special use permit. Prior 
to the Islamic Center's application, however, the City's Board of Aldermen had granted special usc 
permits to all nine Christian churches that applied. The Fifth Circuit, therefore, rejected the City's 
claim that its denial of the permit was based solely on concerns over '"traffic control and public 
safety." Islamic Ctr., X40 F.2d at ~02. 
153. Sec Keetch and Richards, supra note 3, at 736-53. In their article, Keetch and Richards 
reveal and evaluate the tlndings of a 1997 study of religious land use cases in the United States. The 
study examined a total of 196 cases decided between 1921 and 1996. Of the 196 cases, federal courts 
decided only twenty-six, or 13'X,. Circuit courts decided eleven of the twenty-six federal cases. 
154. Si'c id Of the twenty-six federal cases. religious claimants received favorable rulings in 
twelve, or 46%. For circuit court decisions, the percentage of favorable rulings was 36",{, (four favor-
able rulings out of eleven total decisions). In contrast, the percentage of favorable rulings in state 
court decisions was 62% (I 06 favorable rulings out of 170 total decisions). 
155. 946 F. Supp. 1225 (E. D. Va. 1996 ). In Stuart Circle Parish, the Parish sought a tempo-
rary restraining order against the City of Richmond's zoning board to preclude it from enforcing 
restrictions on its Meal Ministry program-a weekly service designed to feed and provide worship 
and pastoral care for Richmond's urban poor. 
156. ld at 1239. 
157. Si!e id. Richmond's zoning ordinance restricted feeding and housing programs for home-
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In Stuart Circle Parish, the court, in determining the level of burden 
and nature of the religious exercise, adopted a t1exible approach that was 
relatively deferential to the Parish. 158 First, the court stated that one of the 
factors to be considered "in determining the substantiality of the burden" 
was "whether a particular practice is mandated by religion or simply en-
couraged."159 Moreover, the court held that "[a]nother factor that obvi-
ously must be taken into account ... is the extent of the interference." 160 
Finally, the court held that even though the Parish could, under the terms 
of the ordinance, continue to feed the poor in some capacity, it could not 
fulfill its religious mission. 161 
In addition to homeless shelters, courts in other land use contexts 
have applied standards for defining "substantial burden on free exercise" 
that are more deferential to religious claimants. In Alpine Christian Fel-
lowship v. County Commissioners, 162 for instance, the court examined the 
question of whether the County "impermissibly burdened the religious 
activities of the Church" by refusing to allow the Church to operate a 
private school at its facility. 163 The court, in holding that the County vio-
lated the Free Exercise Clause, declared that "the conduct of a school 
within the church building is integrally related to the religious belief of 
less to no more than thirty individuals and for no more than seven days between October and April. 
With Meal Ministry, the Parish served approximately one hundred people each Sunday afternoon 
throughout the year. Under the terms of the ordinance, therefore, the Parish was prohibited from 
serving the poor for 45 out of 52 Sundays. And even on those rare Sundays when it would be al-
lowed to operate Meal Ministry, it would have to tum away more than half of the people who typi-
cally attend. To the court, this forced the Parish to abstain from a religiously mandated action. See 
id. 
!58. But see First Assembly of God v. Collier County, 20 F.3d 419, 424 (II th Cir.) (upholding 
County's closure of church's homeless shelter on grounds that the burden on the church to "move 
the shelter to an appropriately zoned area, is less than the burden on the County were it to be forced 
to allow the zoning violation") (quoting Grosz, 721 F.2d at 741) modified on denial ofreh 'g 27 F.3d 
526 ( 1994). In following Grosz, the First Assembly court's balance tipped in favor of the govern-
ment's interests. See infra note 209. 
1.59. Stuart Circle Parish, 946 F. Supp. at 1238 (quoting Turner-Bey v. Lee, 935 F. Supp. 702, 
703 (D. Md. 1996)). 
160. !d. at 1238. The court also cited Mack v. O'Leary, 80 F.3d 1175, 1179 (7th Cir. 1996), 
which held that a substantial burden under RFRA was "one that forces adherents of a religion to re-
frain trom religiously motivated conduct, inhibits or constrains conduct or expression that manifests 
a central tenet of a person's religious beliefs, or compels conduct or expression that is contrary to 
those beliefs." 
161 See Stuart Circle Parish, 946 F. Supp. at 1236. In declaring the Meal Ministry a legiti-
mate religious exercise, the court cited an expert witness in Christian theology who "testified that 
feeding the poor is central to the Christian teachings of all denominations comprising the Stuart Cir-
cle Parish." /d. The court's contemplative analysis of the Parish's situation differs significantly from 
the Sixth Circuit's approach in Lakewood. See supra notes 145-147 and accompanying text. 
162. 870 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo. !994). 
163. !d. at 992. The Church resided in an agricultural and forestry district (AF-1 ), where 
churches were penni !led by right, but private schools were permitted only upon issuance of a special 
usc permit. Such schools were considered "contingent uses" in the County's land use code. 
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the church membership." 164 The district court's evaluation of "religious 
exercise" differs significantly from the approaches taken by circuit courts 
in cases such as Lakewood and St. Bartholomew 's. 165 
In similar fashion, the Washington Supreme Court demonstrated sig-
nificant concern for the church plaintiff in Firs·t United Methodist 
Church ofSeattle v. Hearing Examinerfor the Seattle Landmarks Pres-
ervation Board. 166 In First United Methodist, the City's Landmarks Pres-
ervation Board designated the interior and exterior of First United Meth-
odist's church building a landmark. Consequently, the Church was 
prohibited from making alterations to the building "without City ap-
proval unless such changes [were] necessitated by changes in the lit-
urgy."I67 
The Church, however, disputed the landmark designation, arguing 
that the church structure had deteriorated to a point where it could no 
longer afford the necessary repairs. 16x The court accepted the Church's 
arguments and held that the landmark ordinance "severely" burdened 
First United Methodist's free exercise of religion. 169 The court held the 
Church should be free to "[sell] its property and [use] the proceeds to ad-
vance its religious mission." 170 As with Stuart Circle Parish and Alpine 
Christian Fellowship, the Washington Supreme Court's approach to 
!64. !d. at 994. Interestingly, the court cited Emplovment Div. v. S'mith, 494 U.S. X72 ( !990). 
but only to establish that the burden on religious exercise must be "substantial" to constitute a consti-
tutional violation. See Alpine Christian Fellowship, g7() f. Supp. at 994. The court did not discuss 
whether the County's land usc code was a "neutral law of general applicability." Language in the 
opinion, however, suggests that the court considered the County's action to be targeted at the 
Church's religious mission: "The restriction on the educational usc of the building is not different. in 
principle, trom a government imposed restriction on the religious ceremonial practices in the 
church." !d. at 995. 
!65. See supra notes !45-!50 and accompanying text. The district court in Alpine Christian 
Fellowship also deviated from the traditional approach taken by the Supreme Court and Courts of 
Appeals in Free Exercise Clause cases. Historically. these courts have rejected claims against gov-
ernment regulation of religious conduct. See Marci Hamilton, The Belief/Conduct Paradigm in the 
Supreme Court's Free Ewrcise Jurisprudence: A Theological Account of'the Failure to Protect Re-
ligious Conduct, 54 OHIO ST. L.J. 7!3 (!993) (demonstrating that the Supreme Court's approach to 
Free Exercise Clause cases, with very few exceptions, has been to declare restrictions upon religious 
belief as unconstitutional, but to allow government regulation of religious conduct). 
166. 9l6P.2d374(Wash.l996). 
!67. !d. at376. 
!68. The Church also claimed that changes in the neighborhood surrounding the church had 
dramatically reduced its membership. lt argued that the present size of the sanctuary was "'too large 
to foster as dynamic and meaningful worship services as desired." !d. Moreover. the church main-
tained that it should be allowed to sell any portion of its property to "fund religious and social ser-
vice programs." !d. 
!69. !d. at38l. 
!70. !d. The court also speculated on the constitutional impact of alternative religious uses or 
land. For instance, the court asked "lf the congregation decided that the building should be operated 
exclusively as a soup kitchen. would that be a cessation of religious purpose'1" /d. at 3XO. (quoting 
Brief of Amici Curiae Christian Legal Society at l 1-!2). 
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evaluating the level of burden on religious exercise differs significantly 
from that taken by most circuit courts. 
As the foregoing analysis has shown, the meanings of "substantial 
burden" and "religious exercise" in land use cases are not clearly estab-
lished.171 While some actions certainly reside outside constitutional 
boundaries, 172 others are more problematic. 173 Some of RLUIPA 's other 
land use provisions, however, raise even more difficult definitional is-
sues. 
B. The Judicial Definition of "Less than Equal Terms" Is Also 
Indeterminate 
Section 2(b) of RLUIPA, entitled "Discrimination and Exclusion," 
contains the statute's remaining land use provisions. This section con-
tains terms that are even more ambiguous than "substantial burden" and 
"religious exercise." For example, section 2(b )(1) states: "No govern-
ment shall impose or implement a land use regulation in a manner that 
treats a religious assembly or institution on less than equal terms with a 
nonreligious assembly or institution." 174 The key phrase in this section is 
"less than equal terms." 
Unlike "substantial burden," which has long been part of the Court's 
vernacular, "less than equal terms" or similar phrases do not typically 
appear in free exercise cases. Even Congress, in the legislative record for 
RLUIPA, did not make it abundantly clear what constitutes unequal 
171. Notably, in one of the first federal cases involving RLUIPA's land use provisions, a dis-
trict court denied the plaintiffs' free exercise claims on grounds that the zoning ordinance, on its face 
and as applied, did not substantially burden the free exercise of religion. See C.L.U.B. v. City of 
Chicago, No. 94CV6151, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3791 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 200I).In C.L.U.B., the 
district court set a high bar for the plaintiffs to establish a substantial burden. The court declared: "A 
substantial burden exists when the government pressures a plaintiff to modify her behavior and vio-
late her beliefs, by, for example, discriminating against her because of her religious bcliet~ inhibiting 
her dissemination of particular religious views or pressuring her to forgo a religious practice." !d. at 
*33. 
172. See, e.g, Messiah Baptist Church v. County of Jefferson, R59 F.2d 820, 826 ( 1988) (de-
claring that a church docs not "have a constitutional right to build its house of worship where it 
pleases") (citing Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S 602 (1971)); Islamic Ctr. of Miss., Inc. v. City of 
Starkville, 840 F.2d 293, 302-03 (5th Cir. 1988) (holding that the city violated the First Amendment 
by denying a special use permit to Islamic Center, when it had previously awarded similar permits to 
nine different Christian Churches); Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 72 I F.2d 729, 736 (I 983) (hold-
ing that laws interfering only with religious claimants' "secular, philosophical, or personal choices" 
do not violate the Free Exercise Clause)(citing Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 2 I 5-16 (I 972); 
EEOC v. Miss. Coli., 626 F.2d 477, 488 ( 1980)). 
I 73. See. e.g., First United Methodist, 916 P.2d at 380 (noting, without drawing constitutional 
conclusions, that religious property uses include "education, day care, the provision of food and 
shelter, counseling, and retreats") (citing Brief of amici curiae Christian Legal Society at I 1-12). 
I 74. Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, ~ 2(b )(I). 
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treatment. 175 Some of the anecdotal evidence in the legislative record, 
however, provides guidance as to what types of situations Congress may 
have been referring. 
Illinois Congressman Henry J. Hyde, for instance, presented the case 
of a church in Grand Haven, Michigan that signed a lease for a storefront 
property and then applied for a building permit to modify the space. 176 
City officials, however, informed the church that zoning regulations pro-
hibited religious meetings and worship at that location. 177 City officials 
claimed the zoning ordinance for the business (B 1) district in which the 
church's property resides did not allow houses of worship as ofright. m 
The ordinance did, however, specifically allow "private clubs and 
schools, fraternal organizations, concert halls, and funeral homes." 179 In 
response, the church argued that it was obviously a "place of public as-
sembly," but city officials disagreed and denied the permit. 1so Ultimately, 
after a religious liberties defense organization filed suit against Grand 
Haven on behalf of the church, city attorneys agreed to terms of a con-
sent judgment that granted a building permit to the church. 181 
The Grand Haven ordinance appears to demonstrate the unequal 
treatment Congress intended section 2(b )( 1) to prevent. The impact of 
secular assemblies and institutions the ordinance allowed in the B I dis-
trict is similar to, if not greater than, churches or other houses of worship. 
For instance, the traffic generated by concert halls on the night of a per-
formance is at least equivalent to that of a typical church service. More-
over, a private school located in the business district would engender 
more significant safety concerns than a house of worship. 
Despite Grand Haven and other examples of land use regulations 
treating religious assemblies on "less than equal terms" than secular as-
semblies, it is unclear whether the problem is pervasive enough to save 
section 2(b)(l). 182 Based on Flores and the Court's subsequent Section 5 
175. Representative Charles T. Canady, the House's chief sponsor of RLUIPA, did state that 
"less than equal terms ... more squarely addresses the case in which the unequal treatment of differ-
ent land uses docs not fall into any apparent pattern." 146 CONG. RI'C. El563 (daily cd. Sept. 22, 
2000) (statement by Rep. Canady). This claritication, however, is oflittlc use without context. 
176. See 146 CONG. REC. El564 (daily ed. Sept. 22, 2000) (document submitted by Rep. 
Hyde). 
177. See id. 
178. See id. 
179. ld 
180. Jd 
ItO. See Haven Shores Cmty. Church v. City of Grand Haven, File No. I :00-cv-175 (W.O. 
Mich. Dec. 20, 2000) (consent judgment). In the consent judgment, District Court Judge David W. 
McKeague stated that Grand Haven's zoning ordinance would not survive review under RLUIPA 
because it "prohibited a church or other religious use in" the district. !d. From this language, it is not 
clear what specific section(s) ofRLUIPA Judge McKeague believed the ordinance to have violated. 
182. Another example of unequal treatment appears in the previously cited case of C.L.U.B. v. 
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cases, Congress must demonstrate that unequal treatment of religious as-
semblies results in substantial numbers of constitutional violations. 1x3 If 
not, then the Court will likely consider section 2(b )(I) to be neither re-
d. I . IX4 me 1a nor preventive. 
Does the Court, however, truly intend for Congress to demonstrate 
widespread patterns of constitutional violations for every law it passes 
under the Enforcement Clause? For instance, assume, for the sake of ar-
gument, that the Court recently declared homosexuals to be a suspect 
class. 1x5 Would a subsequent law prohibiting states from criminalizing 
homosexual sodomy be valid under Section 5? 1x6 
In this hypothetical situation, Congress would appear to be well 
within its Enforcement Clause power. The law would simply prevent 
City of Chicago. No. 94CVfl 151, 2001 U.S. Dist. LEX IS 3791 (N.D. Ill. Mar. 30, 2001 ). See supra 
note 171. In C.L. UB., the city's zoning ordinance required religious institutions to obtain special usc 
permits for establishing worship centers in all business, commercial, and manufacturing districts, 
while allowing as of right "clubs and lodges," "meeting halls," and "recreation buildings and com-
munity centers." !d. at *fl-7. The city, however, in response to litigation, amended the ordinance's 
language to require special use permits for the secular uses. See id. at *7. 
I R3. Sec, <'.g. Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coil. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 
627, 640 ( 1999) ("In enacting the Patent Remedy Act, however, Congress identified no pattern of 
patent infringement by the States, let alone a pattern of constitutional violations."); Flori's, 521 U.S. 
at 530 (holding that the legislative record for RFRA. unlike the records in the Voting Rights Act 
cases. lacked "examples of modern instances of generally applicable laws passed because of reli-
gious bigotry"). 
I R4. Section 2(b) of RLUIPA contains two other main subsections: section 2(b )(2), titled 
"Nondiscrimination," and section 2(b)(3). titled "Exclusions and Limits." Each of these faces its own 
constitutional dit1iculties. First. although the meaning of 2(b)(2) is much less ambiguous than 
2(b )(I )--the definition of religious discrimination is well-established in equal protection and em-
ployment discrimination law--the record of land usc regulations discriminating against religious 
assemblies and institutions may be insufficient. 
Similarly, there is little ambiguity in subsection 2(b)(3)(a), which states that "no government shall 
impose or implement a land use regulation that totally excludes religious assemhliesfi·om ajurisdic-
tion. "Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act~ 2(b)(3)(a). Despite the "not in my 
backyard" opposition to religious assemblies in many areas. however, it is far from certain that 
courts will find that such evidence meets the "congruence and proportionality" test. See Laycock. 
supra note 3, at 759-63 for discussion of land use regulations and the exclusion of houses of wor-
ship. 
hnally. subscctiun 2(b)(3)(b) may have a definitional problem similar to the "less than equal terms" 
language in subsection 2(b)( I). Subsection 2(b)(3)(b) prohibits governments from imposing or im-
plementing land usc regulations that '"unreasonably rlimit] religious assemblies, institutions. or struc-
tures within a JUrisdiction." Religious Land Usc and Institutionalized Persons Act ~ 2(b)(3)(b). 
While "reasonableness" is certainly common in torts and other areas of law, courts reviewing 
RI.U!Pi\ may find it diflicult to define precisely what constitutes an "unreasonable limit" on a reli-
gious assembly. institution. or structure. 
I X5. Under the Court's current equal protection jurisprudence. homosexuals are not defined as 
either a suspect or quasi-suspect class. See Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, fl32 (1996) (applying ra-
tional basis test to strike down an amendment to the Colorado Constitution that prohibited legisla-
tive. executive, orjudicial actions designed to offer special protection to homosexuals). 
I X6. In Bowers v. Hardwick. 47R U.S. I X6 ( 1986), the Court upheld an equivalent Georgia 
statute on grounds that the Fourteenth Amendment did not create a fundamental right for homosexu-
als to engage in sodomy. 
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states from violating the Equal Protection Clause as defined by the Su-
preme Court. However, under the standard established by Flores and 
subsequent cases, Congress would be unable to compile a significant re-
cord of constitutional violations. Even for the states that have anti-
sodomy statutes, they are almost never enforced. 187 
Similarly, Professor Laycock has argued that prior to Flores, Con-
gress passed many statutes for which substantial legislative records of 
constitutional violations were not established. 1x8 For instance, Laycock 
noted that in 1978 when Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act, the Supreme Court had held that pregnancy discrimination violated 
neither the Equal Protection Clause nor Title VII. 1x9 Therefore if Con-
gress were to pass the same legislation today, the Court would have sig-
nificant difficulty in upholding it. 190 
C. Whether RLUJPA 's Land Use Provisions Are Remedial or Preventive 
in Nature is an Open Question 
Despite the glaring inconsistency between Flores and some earlier 
statutes passed under the Enforcement Clause, RLUIPA 's land use provi-
sions will likely have to meet Flores's congruence and proportionality 
standard to pass constitutional inspection. The congruence prong should 
not be a significant hurdle because RLUIPA's land use provisions only 
target land use regulations that substantially burden the free exercise of 
religion. The proportionality prong, however, will be more troublesome. 
As previously shown, the application of most land use regulations in 
the United States likely falls under Smith's individualized assessments 
exception. Because the constitutional definitions of "substantial burden 
on free exercise" and "less than equal terms," are somewhat unclear, 
however, it is not certain whether RLUIPA's application of strict scru-
tiny is proportional to the frequency with which land use regulations vio-
late the Free Exercise Clause. 
The Flores Court, in addition to depicting Congress's enforcement 
power under Section 5 as remedial and preventive, declared that the 
power to enforce does not include the power to alter the meaning of con-
stitutional provisions. 191 Stated differently, "Congress docs not enforce a 
187. See Bowers. 478 U.S. at 198 (Powell, J., concurring) (noting the historical lack of en-
forcement of the Georgia statute). 
18R See Laycock, supra note 39, at 747 n.l9. 
I R9. See id. at 753. 
190. See id. ("There is not the slightest reason to believe that the Pregnancy Discrimination 
Act is congruent with and proportionate to any constitutional violations as the Court defines them."). 
191. Se!' Flores, 521 U.S. at 519. 
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constitutional right by changing what the right is." 192 
Consequently, if the Court were to determine that land use regula-
tions so infrequently place substantial burdens on religious exercise, then 
it would also likely conclude that with RLUIPA, Congress intended to 
change the meaning of the Free Exercise Clause. The rationale for such a 
conclusion would resemble the following: "Land use regulations only 
occasionally infringe upon the free exercise rights of individuals and re-
ligious institutions. Congress, therefore, by requiring strict scrutiny re-
view of land use regulations that place substantial burdens on religious 
exercise, attempted to change the existing judicial interpretation of the 
Free Exercise Clause. In other words, Congress tried to create constitu-
tional rights that did not exist." 
In Flores, the Court held that the legislative record for RFRA did not 
reflect a widespread pattern of religious discrimination. 193 Indeed, the 
Court concluded that the legislative record for RFRA only revealed "in-
cidental" burdens, which was inconsistent with the law's stated pur-
pose.194 Moreover, the Court concluded that RFRA 's scope--"displacing 
laws and prohibiting official actions of almost every description and sub-
ject matter"-was severely "out of proportion to a supposed remedial or 
. b' ,\9' preventive o ~ect. -
In contrast to RFRA, the legislative history for RLUIPA demon-
strates a significant record of land use regulations substantially interfer-
ing with religious assembly. 196 Furthermore, the record supporting 
RLUIPA documents many instances in which localities have used land 
use regulations in arbitrary, even discriminatory, manners to prevent the 
establishment of houses of worship. 197 Congress, keenly aware of the 
192. ld 
193. See id at 532. Professor Laycock, who served as lead counsel lilr Archbishop Flores, 
subsequently explained the reason for RFRA 's scant legislative record. First. he noted that no one 
foresaw that documenting large numbers of constitutional violations in the record would have any 
constitutional significance. See Laycock, supra note 39, at 774-75. A second reason Professor Lay-
cock offered was that RFRA's proponents could not illustrate the most egregious examples of Free 
Exercise violations, "because, almost by definition, seriously persecuted religions arc highly un-
popular." !d at 775. Specifically, he noted that when Representative Stephen Solarz, RFRA 's chief 
sponsor in the House, sought to file a congressional amicus brief for Lukumi, no\ a single representa-
tive or senator would agree to sign it. Sec id at 776. The peculiar "Santeria religion was too unpopu-
lar to touch." ld 
194. Flores, 521 U.S. at 530. 
195. ld at 532. 
196. See H.R. REP. No. I 06-219, at I X-24 ( 1999); Laycock, supra note 3 at 769-X3. Both II.R. 
REP. No. 106-219, which was originally submilled as part of the record for the "Religious Liberty 
Protection Act of 1999," and the Laycock article arc cited in 146 CoN<i. RH. S7774 (daily ed. July 
27, 2000) (exhibit submitted by Sens. Hatch and Kennedy). Sel' also Keetch and Richards. supra 
note 3. The study that Keetch and Richards summarize in their article is also cited in H.R. Rt'P. No. 
I 06-219. 
197. See infra notes 20:2-203 and accompanying text. 
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Court's skeptical view of its Enforcement Clause power, went to great 
lengths to demonstrate that RLUIPA was preventive and remedial legis-
lation. 
The Supreme Court's recent evaluation of the legislative record for 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA) provides another 
point of comparison for RLUIPA. In Kimel v. Florida Board of Re-
gents, 19R the Court held that Congress failed to demonstrate "any pattern 
of age discrimination by the States."199 As a result, the Court concluded 
that ADEA was not preventive, but substantive in nature. ADEA, the 
Court declared, prohibited "substantially more state employment deci-
sions and practices than would likely be held unconstitutional" under the 
Court's equal protection standard of review for age discrimination 
laws.Z00 
In contrast to ADEA, Congress provided what it believed to be a 
substantial record of statistical and anecdotal evidence indicating uncon-
stitutional religious discrimination in land use regulation?01 The record 
for RLUIPA indicates that local government officials, exercising "virtu-
ally unlimited discretion," frequently deny permits to religious organiza-
tions in arbitrary and discriminatory fashions. 202 Moreover, the record 
indicates that minority religious groups are vastly over-represented in 
land use litigation, indicating discriminatory treatment. 203 Finally, there-
cord provides some evidence that there is a substantial disparity between 
the number of reported religious land use cases and actual conflicts be-
l. . . . d 1 d 1 204 tween re IgJOus orgamzatwns an an use regu ators. 
198. 528 u s. 62 (2000). 
199. ld at 89. 
200. !d. at 86. Specifically, the Court cited several of its own decisions where it held that age 
classifications are presumptively rational. The Court further noted that even when States rely on 
"broad generalizations," such laws do "not violate the Equal Protection Clause." !d. at 84-85. 
201. See H.R. REP. No. 106-219, at 18. 
202. !d. at 18-22. For example, the report cites evidence where non-religious assemblies such 
as community centers, health clubs. lodges, and museums "arc often permitted as of right in zones 
where churches require a special use permit, or permitted on special use pennit where churches are 
wholly excluded." !d. at 19-20. 
203. !d. at 20-21. Specifically, the report states that "Jews, small Christian denominations, and 
nondenominational churches arc vastly overrepresented in reported church zoning cases .... Reli-
gious groups accounting for only 9% of the population account for 50% of the reported litigation 
involving location of churches and 34% of the reported litigation involving accessory uses at exist-
ing churches." !d. This same evidence is also summarized in Keetch and Richards, supra note 3, at 
736-42. 
204. H.R. REP. No. I 06-219, at 21 (noting that over a five-year period while "roughly 325 to 
400" Presbyterian congregations reported conflicts over land use permits, there were only five total 
reported cases involving Presbyterian churches): cf Thomas C. Berg, The New Attacks on Religious 
Freedom Legislation, and Why they are Wrong, 21 CARDOZO L. REV. 415, 421 (1999). Professor 
Berg explains that free exercise "disputes are more likely to be settled when the government has a 
weak reason for its policy or it can easily accommodate the needs of the religious believer." !d. Berg 
further notes that religious freedom legislation gives religious believers and organizations "real lev-
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Based on the foregoing, it is doubtful that courts reviewing RLUIPA 
will reach conclusions similar to the Supreme Court's concerning 
ADEA. In Kimel, the Court held that Congress failed to identify "any 
discrimination whatsoever that rose to the level of constitutional viola-
tion."205 With RLUIPA, Congress appears to have met this minimum re-
quirement. Whether the record establishes RLUIPA's land use provisions 
as valid exercises of Congress's Enforcement Clause power, however, is 
a much more difficult question. 
First, reviewing courts' interpretations of "substantial burden" and 
"religious exercise" will be critical. If courts apply the most restrictive 
interpretations of these terms, then they will likely fail to regard all but 
the most egregious examples as unconstitutiona1.206 Additionally, courts 
may conclude that there is insufficient evidence to establish that govern-
ments frequently "impose or implement land use regulations" in manners 
which treat religious assemblies on "less than equal terms" with secular 
assemblies.207 
Finally, it is possible, though perhaps unlikely, that courts will strike 
down RLUIPA's land use provisions on grounds that strict scrutiny, his-
torically, has failed to effectively protect religious conduct. As some 
commentators have noted, the Supreme Court has demonstrated only a 
"flickering commitment" to the compelling state interest test. 20g More-
over, circuit courts have tended to support governmental interests in reli-
gious land use cases. 209 
Considering this history, it is possible that courts reviewing RLUIPA 
will undervalue the religious interests in land use cases. The difficulty, as 
one commentator notes, is that zoning ordinances are typically linked to 
"at least one extremely significant public value" such as protecting the 
erage in negotiating with government officials--{forcing them] to give some consideration to reli-
gious claims when they otherwise would not." !d. 
205. Kimel, 528 U.S. at 89. 
206. For example, if reviewing courts look only at circuit court religious land use cases and 
their respective intcrpretatit>ns of what constitutes a "substantial burden on religious exercise," then 
perhaps Islamic Center will represent the model for Free Exercise violations; see supra note 151. If 
so, then the vast majority of evidence presented by Congress in support of RLUIP A will prove futile. 
207. Religious Land Usc and Institutionalized Persons Act § 2(b)( I). Recall, however, that 
RLUJPA contains a severability clause. See id.§ 5(i). Therefore, the Court could, for instance, up-
hold section 2(a)(2)(c) and strike down 2(b)( I). 
208. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 25, at 450 (noting the rare occasions in which the Court, 
prior to Smith, upheld claims involving religious conduct exemptions to neutral laws). 
209. See, e.g, Grosz v. City of Miami Beach, 721 F.2d 729, 739 (II th Cir. 1983) ('Together, 
the important objectives underlying zoning and the degree of infringement of those objectives 
caused by allowing the religious conduct to continue place a heavy weight on the government's side 
of the balancing scale."). 
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public health, safety, or welfare. 210 As a result, religious demands "often 
d h . k . . ,211 ten to s nn m companson. 
Courts preconceived to view governmental interests in regulating 
land use as more important than the needs of religious communities to 
have appropriate facilities in which to worship will likely view strict 
scrutiny as excessive. Correspondingly, such courts will be less inclined 
to declare RLUIPA as either remedial or preventive. Conversely, courts 
could recognize that a legitimate balancing of religious and governmen-
tal interests would render RLUIPA's use of strict scrutiny as an effective 
method for protecting the right to religious assembly in many cases. 212 
D. RLUIPA Invokes Federalism Concerns Because Land Use Is an Area 
ofLaw Regulated by State and Local Governments 
Closely related to the issue of whether Congress, by enacting 
RLUIPA's land use provisions, acted within the scope of its Enforcement 
Clause power are concerns over federalism. Issues regarding Congress's 
possible encroachment upon state and local authority are primarily struc-
tural in nature. 213 Flores and subsequent Supreme Court cases dealing 
with Section 5 hold that the Constitution places distinct limits on Con-
gress's powers over the states. 214 
Numerous reasons exist for the constitutionally imposed restraints on 
Congress's powers over the States. Federalism protects "liberty by dis-
persing governmental power," brings "government closer to the people," 
permits "the law to be tailored to local circumstances and local political 
preferences" and allows local governments to experiment with legislative 
2 I 0. Godshall, supra note I 46, at I 576. 
2 I I !d. 
212. See Colin L. Black, Comment; The Free Exercise Clause and Historic Preservation Law: 
Suggestions/or a More Coherent Free Exercise Analysis, 72 TUL. L. REV. I 767, 1803 (1998) (argu-
ing that a proper balancing of governmental and religious interests would produce more coherent and 
consistent results in religious land use cases). 
213. See Hamilton, supra note 39, at 701 n.9 (stating that in Flores, the Court "engaged in 
structural analysis" when it asked "the categorical question whether" Congress, with RFRA, acted 
"within the boundaries of its constitutionally circumscribed powers"). Of course the Tenth Amend-
ment specifically addresses the powers retained by the "States respectively, or to the people." U.S. 
CONST. amend. X. The primary purpose of the Tenth Amendment, however, like the Ninth, is to 
delineate the Constitution's structural protection of liberty. 
214. See Flores, 521 U.S. at 516 ("Under our Constitution, the Federal Government is one of 
enumerated powers .... Congress relied on its Fourteenth Amendment enforcement power in enact-
ing the most far-reaching and substantial of RFRA's provisions, those which impose its requirements 
on the States.") (citations omitted); see also United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 607 (2000) 
("Every law enacted by Congress must be based on one or more of its powers enumerated in the 
Constitution. 'The powers of the legislature are defined and limited; and that those limits may not be 
mistaken or forgotten, the constitution is written."') (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, I 76 
(I 803 )). 
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and administrative actions.215 These benefits of local control apply di-
rectly to land use regulation. 
Local governments are generally better able to respond to their con-
stituents' concerns over land use issues than Congress or federal execu-
tive agencies. Local officials have the ability to take quick (on a govern-
ment responsiveness scale, anyway) administrative and legislative 
actions, to hear complaints from residents over proposed land uses and to 
grant variances or special use permits for non-conforming uses. And 
consequently Congress, by passing land use legislation, risks interfering 
with an area of law designed to be controlled at the state and local 
level.216 
One of the principal reasons for RFRA's demise was its extensive in-
terference with state law. Both the Flores Court and RFRA's critics ex-
pressed this concern. In Flores, the Court declared that RFRA, by "[re-
quiring] searching judicial scrutiny of state law with the attendant 
likelihood of invalidation," intruded considerably "into the States' tradi-
tional prerogatives and general authority to regulate for the health and 
welfare of their citizens."217 Similarly, Professors Eisgruber and Sager 
argued that "RFRA's displacement of state authority [was] unusually 
broad," potentially affecting nearly all state laws.m 
With RLUIPA, Congress diffused the "unlimited scope" objections 
that befell RFRA by limiting the categories of state laws subject to strict 
scrutiny review. Nonetheless, because RLUIPA's land use provisions re-
quire judicial review of state laws and decisions, the same federalism is-
sues apply. Professor Conkle, in his article anticipating RLUIPA-like 
legislation, discussed the federalism implications of such a law in de-
tail. 219 
According to Conkle's analysis, even if a court were to declare 
RLUIPA a valid exercise of Congress's Enforcement Clause power, it is 
possible that it would hold it unconstitutional based solely on independ-
ent state sovereignty prindples.Z2° Conkle based his argument on the 
Court's noted federalism rulings in New York v. United Statei21 and 
215. Daniel 0. Conkle, Free Exercise, Federalism, and the States as Laboratories, 21 
CARDOZO L. REV. 493, 494-95 ( 1999). 
216. Recall that with the Standard Zoning Enabling Act, the Commerce Department did not 
impose its provisions upon the states. Instead, it designed the act only to serve as a model for states 
adopting their own zoning enabling laws. Sec supra notes 55-59 and accompanying text. 
217. Flores, 521 U.S. at 534. 
218. Eisgruber & Sager, supra note 25, at 464. The authors also characterized RFRA as "ca-
pricious," repeating their assertion that strict scrutiny was inconsistent with the Court's Free Exer-
cise Clause jurisprudence. !d. 
219. See Conkle, supra note 40, at 654-60. 
220. See id. at 658-60. 
221. 505 U.S. 144 (1992). In New York, the Court struck down a provision of the Radioactive 
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Printz v. United States. 222 He asserted that the Court could very we II de-
clare that a law such as RLUIPA, which regulates state and local gov-
ernments' regulation of land use, is an unacceptable congressional intru-
sion.223 After all, as the Court declared in Gregory v. Ashcroft,224 "the 
Fourteenth Amendment does not override all principles offederalism."225 
Despite the legitimate constitutional arguments for protecting state 
and local governments from federal interference, there is another impor-
tant aspect of federalism ignored by the Court's recent decisions. Feder-
alism is a structural threat to liberty. 226 As Professor Laycock explains, 
federalism probably protected constitutional liberties in an era of limited 
government.227 In an era of big government, however, particularly "with-
out vigorous enforcement of constitutional rights, federalism becomes a 
serious structural threat to liberty."228 
Laycock argues that today, with so many different government enti-
ties possessing the power to restrict liberty, federalism, "in conjunction 
with the administrative state," increases the threat to religious free-
dom.229 He declares that in this environment, the only real enforcement 
Waste Policy Amendments Act of 19X5 (42 U.S.C.S. § 2021 b) requiring states to take title of low-
level radioactive waste produced in their state or assume liability for damages resulting from the its 
failure to take possession of such waste. See id. at 174-86. The Court declared that "[ w ]hether one 
views the take title provision as lying outside Congress's enumerated powers, or as infringing upon 
the core of state sovereignty reserved by the Tenth Amendment, the provision is inconsistent with 
the federal structure of our Government established by the Constitution." !d. at 177. 
222. 521 U.S. 898 (1997). Printz, essentially a struch1ral ruling, struck down provisions of the 
Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act ( 18 U.S.C. § 922) requiring local law enforcement officials 
in some states to perfonn background checks on persons attempting to purchase handguns. See id. at 
902-03. Justice Scalia, writing for the Court, stated that the Brady Act provisions, because they were 
not properly grounded on any of Congress's enumerated powers, and required officers "to administer 
or enforce a federal regulatory program," were therefore "fundamentally incompatible with our con-
stitutional system of dual sovereignty." !d. at 935. 
223. See Conkle, supra note 40, at 660 (citing New York, 505 U.S. at 166). Conkle also noted, 
however, that the laws at issue in both New York and Printz were based on the Commerce Clause, 
and therefore the rulings do not apply directly to laws based on Section 5. See Conkle, supra note 
40, at 659 n.l31. As he stated in a previous article, "principles of state sovereignty that might limit 
congressional power under Article I do not apply when Congress properly invokes enforcement 
power under the Civil War Amendments." Daniel 0. Conkle, The Religious Freedom Restoration 
Act: The Constitutional SiRnificance of' an Unconstitutional Statute, 56 MONT. L. REV. 39, 71 n.l62 
( 1995) (citing City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 178-80 ( 1980); Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 
U.S. 445, 456 (1976)). New York and Printz would, of course, apply to section 2(a)(2)(b) of 
RLUIPA, which is grounded on Congress's Commerce Clause powers. 
224. 501 U.S.452(1991). 
225. See Conkle, supra note 40, at 659 n.l31 (quoting Gregon•, 501 U.S. at 469). 
226. See Douglas Laycock, Federalism as a Structural Threat to Liberty, 22 HARV. J.L. & 
PUB. POL'Y 68 ( 1998). 
22 7. See id. at 80. 
228 !d. 
229. !d. at 81. Laycock notes that each of the following governmental actions may prohibit 
religious practices: "an act of Congress, a regulation of a federal agency, an act of a state legislature, 
a regulation of a state agency, an act of a county board or a county agency, an act of a city council or 
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of religious and other constitutional liberties occurs at the federal level. 
Specifically, Congress and the federal judiciary are the only viable 
f . ~ l'b 230 sources o protectiOn tOr 1 erty. · 
Professor Laycock therefore contends that the Court, by pruning 
Congress's Enforcement Clause powers, has endangered religious and 
other constitutional liberties. 231 Moreover, recent efforts to restrict judi-
cial scrutiny of individual rights exacerbate the problem. As another 
commentator explains, judicial enforcement of individual rights is neces-
sary, because "the political process left to itself may not adequately pro-
tect the rights of minorities and dissenters."232 This argument is espe-
cially germane to the current analysis if the statistics on the over-
representation of minority religions in land use cases are accepted. 233 
The argument that a national government provides greater protection 
for the rights of minority groups than state and local governments is not 
of recent origin. In Federalist No. 10, James Madison explained that a 
"well-constructed Union" tends "to break and control the violence of fac-
tion."234 Madison argued that a republic is superior to a pure democracy 
because the government encompasses a "greater number of citizens and 
extent of territory."235 This factor, Madison declared, "renders factious 
combinations less to be dreaded."236 Similarly, though factious leaders 
may exert tremendous influence at local, and even state levels, the "Un-
ion" will typically preclude them from exerting influence over other 
states. 237 
The federalism implications of RLUIPA's land use provisions en-
gender persuasive arguments on both sides. Based on Flores and the 
Court's other recent Section 5 cases, however, it is doubtful that argu-
ments such as Professor Laycock's will receive significant consideration. 
city agency, an act of a special purpose district, a state court exercising common law powers, or a 
federal court sitting in diversity and predicting common law developments." /d. 
230. See id. at 81-82. 
231. See id. at 82 ("Pulling Congress out of the balance fimdamentally changes the structure of 
liberty in our country. It fundamentally changes the relation of federalism to liberty, because it 
leaves all these multiple sources of regulation with no central or unified source of power to protect 
liberty."). 
232. William Marshall, American Political Culture and the Failures o/ Process Fcdaalism, 
22 HI\RY. J.L. & PUH. POL'Y 139, 155 {199X). 
233. See supra note 203. 
234. THE FEDERALIST No. I 0, at 129 (James Madison) (Howard Mumford Jones cd., 1% I). 
Madison defined a faction as "a number of citizens, whether amounting to a majority or a minority 
of the whole, who are united and actuated by some common impulse of passion, or of interest, ad-
versed to the rights of other citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." 
/d. at 130. 
235. !d. at 135. 
236. !d. 
237. !d. at 135-36. 
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Yet, predicting the Court's future treatment of legislation is anything but 
an exact science.23x 
V. CONCLUSION 
At a minimum level, RLUIPA's land use provisions are distinct from 
RFRA and the subsequent statutes the Court struck down as exceeding 
Congress's Enforcement Clause power. Unlike RFRA, RLUIPA's land 
use provisions do not implicate virtually every area of state law. Fur-
thermore, most land use regulations in America, through the granting of 
variances and special use permits, do not operate as neutral, generally 
applicable laws. Consequently Congress, by requiring strict scrutiny re-
view for the imposition and implementation of land use regulations that 
place substantial burdens on religious exercise, does not appear to have 
altered the Supreme Court's interpretation of the Free Exercise Clause. 
Moreover, in contrast to the Age Discrimination in Employment Act 
("ADEA'') and the Patent Remedy Act, the legislative history for 
RLUIPA demonstrates at least a significant and growing problem with 
land use regulations infringing upon the right to religious assembly.239 
Whether the congressional record for RLUIP A illustrates a widespread 
pattern of First Amendment violations is debatable but is not an outland-
ish assertion. 
Thus it appears that RLUIPA's land use provisions grounded on 
Congress's Enforcement Clause power meet many of the Court's core 
concerns in Flores and subsequent cases. As a result, despite other im-
portant constitutional concerns, it seems unlikely that the Supreme Court 
will strike down all of RLUIPA's land use provisions. If the Court were 
to make such a ruling, then the viability of Section 5 as a means for pro-
tecting constitutional liberties would certainly be in doubt.240 
238. Professor Laycock succinctly illustrates this point: "I confidently expected to win the 
Flores case." Laycock, supra note 39. at 743. 
239. See Kimel, 528 U.S. at 88 (declaring that the ADEA prohibited "very little conduct likely 
to be held unconstitutional"); Florida Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 640 (holding that with the Patent Remedy 
Act, "Congress came up with little evidence of infringing conduct on part of the States"). 
240. Considering RLUIPA's formidable legislative history, a Supreme Court ruling striking 
down all of the land use provisions would essentially establish that only laws equivalent to the Vot-
ing Rights Act are valid exercises of Congress's Section 5 power. Sec, e.g., South Carolina v. 
Katzcnhach, 383 U.S. 301 (1966). And although racial discrimination by state actors certainly still 
exists in the United States, it seems improbable that the current Congress could enact a law designed 
to remedy equal protection violations that would engender a record of unconstitutional conduct sur-
passing that ofRLUIPA. 
